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IN WHAT ACTIONS, AND UPON WHAT FACTS,









This thesis treats of so much of the law pertaining
to the granting of a warrant of attachment of property as is
found in sections six hundred thirty-five and six hundred
thirty-six of the New York Code of Civil Procedure. It does
not, therefore, include the granting of warrants in actions
against. a public officer, etc., for peculation, which is
provided for in section six hundred thirty-seven of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The plan followed has been to quote a
part of the section of the Code of Civil Procedure, and under
that to treat of cases explanatory of the matter quoted.
Section 635:-
"A WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT AGAINST THE PROPERTY OF ONE
OR MORE DEFENDANTS IN AN ACTION MAY BE GRANTED UBON THE APPLI-
CATION OF THE PLAINTIFF." An attachment cannot be demanded
as a matter of right in a case in which it is authorized,
and whether in a particular case the warrant should issue is
within the discretion of the court. (Sartwell v. Field, 68
N. Y. 341) The discretion of the lower court may be reviewed
by the appellate division upon the merits, but an order, re-
fusing or vacating an order granting a warrant of attachment
is not appealable to the Court of Appeals, in any case, un-
less the order shows that it was refused or vacated for want
of power, or unless it presents a question of law or an abso-
lute legal right. If the order is granted in a case not au-
thorized, or if there is an entire absence of facts justify-
ing it, the case would present a question of law, and the or-
der would be appealable. (Allen v. Meyer, 73 N. Y. 1) And
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, upon appeal, of a
question as to whether the property attached is legally the
subject of attachment. (Dunlop v. The Patterson Fire Ins.
Co., 74 N. Y. 145)
"WHERE THE ACTION IS TO RECOVER A SUM OF MONEY ONLY".
It is here to be observred, that the warrant cannot be granted
in actions for equitable relief. (Ebner v. Bradford, 3 Abb. Pr.
N. 5. 248; Thorington v. Merrick, 101 N. Y. 5)
"AS DAMAGES." The warrant cannot be granted for
nominal damages, even in a case authorized by the Code, as it
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is not within the intent of the statute to allow it for nomi-
nal damages; (Walts v. Nichols, 32 Hun. 276) and at a Spec-
ial Term an attachment was vacated, where the amount of dam-
ages was largely conjectural. (White v. Goodson etc. Co.,
68 St. Rep. 719)
"FOR ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING CAUSES." An at-
tachment cannot be granted in an action in which the complaint
sets forth several causes of action, upon some of which an
attachment could not be issued. (Union Consolidated Mining
Co. v. Raht, 9 Hun. 208)
"(I) BREACH OF CONTRACT, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, OTHER THAN
A CONTRACT TO MARRY." An action brought, under section 3247
of the Code of Civil Procedure, to recover the costs of all
former action, which was prosecuted by the present defendant
in the name of a third person, for the defendant's benefit,
is not an action upon contract express or implied, within the
meaning of this section. (The Remington Paper Co. v. O'Dough-
erty, 32 Hun. 255, affirmed 99 N. Y. 673) In The Remington
Paper Co. v. O'Dougherty, supra, it was held that a liability
imposed by provisions of a statute, is not an implied promise,
which was defined as an express promise proved by circumstan-
tial evidence. This definition of an implied promise has not
been followed in subsequent cases. In Gutta Percha etc. Co.
v. Mayor etc., (108 N. Y. 276), it was said that "two kinds
of contracts are contemplated by section 635, express con-
tracts, which are such as are voluntarily made by the part-
ies thereto, and implied contracts, which, though not express-
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ly made by the parties, are made by the law -hen it, enfore-
ing a sound morality and a wise public policy, acting upon
principles of equity and justice, imposes upon a party an ob-
ligation to pay a debt or discharge a duty." And it was ac-
cordingly held that an action on a foreign judgment was an
action on an implied contract. The same conclusion was ar-
rived at in Nazra v. McCalmont oil Co., (36 Hun. 296). The
correct rule undoubtedly is that a judgment is a contract
within the attachment law, but it is not treated as a con-
tract for all purposes. (O'Brien v. Young, 95 N. Y. 428) An
action by the United States for an unpaid duty, is an action
upon an implied contract (United States v. Graff, 67 Barb.
304); but an action upon a statute for a penalty, is otherwise.
(Wilson v. Harvey, 52 How. Pr. 126)
An allegation in the complaint, in an action for
goods sold, that a sale was induced by fraudulent represent-
ations, does not convert, what would otherwise be an action
on contract, into a tort action. The allegation of fraud
affects only the remedy. (Whitney v. Hirsh, 39 Hun. 326)
"(2) WRONGFUL CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY." Thus in
Weill v. Malone (39 State Rep. 899), a warrant was granted in
an action brought for the conversion of certain steel.
"(3) AN INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY, IN CONSEQUENCE OF'
NEGLIGENCE, FRAUD, OR OTHER WRONGFUL ACT." This sub-division
was amended in 1894, prior to which it read, "An injury to
property" instead of "An injury to person or property" as at
present. Injuries to person are defined by section 3343 subd.
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9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to include "libel, slander,
criminal conversation, seduction, and malicious prosecution;
also an assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other action-
able injury to the person either of the plaintiff or another."
The next sub-division (Subd. 12 of section 3343) defines an
"injury to property" as "an actionable act, whereby the es-
tate of another is lessened, other than a personal injury, or
a breach of a contract."
An attachment may be granted in an action to recov-
or damages for fraudulent representations, for such repre-
sentations constitute an "injury to property" within sub.-
sivision 10 of section 3343 of the Code of-Civil Procedure.
(Campion etc. Co. v. Searing, 47 Hun. 237) And so one who
has been induced to make advances on the faith of forged pap-
er has sustained an injury to personal property, and presents
a cause of action in which a warrant of attachment may issue.
(Bogart v. Dart, 25 Hun. 395)
It is, however, to be observed, that while a war-
rant of attachment may issue in an action to recover damages
for fraudulent misrepresentations, that such misrepresenta-
tions are not a ground for the granting of a warrant of atm
tachment. (Goldschmidt v. Hersohorn, 13 State Rep. 580)
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Section 636:-
TO ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFF TO SUCH A WARRANT, HE MUST
SHOW BY AFFIDAVIT, TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE JUDGE GRANTING
THE SAME." A verified pleading is regarded as an affidavit.
(subm-division ii, of section 3343 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure) The affidavit need not be made by the plaintiff, but
may be made by any person who is familiar with the facts.
(Edick v. Green, 38 Hun. 202)
It is always necessary that the application be
founded upon an affidavit containing the matters required to
be stated by section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to
give the court jurisdiction, and the omission of any of the
allegations required to be stated is not a mere irregularity
but a defect of jurisdiction which cannot be remedied by
amendment, and a warrant so obtained will be set aside. (Zer-
egal v. Benoist, 33 How. Pr. 129; McVicker v. Campanini, 24
State Rep. 643) But where the affidavit sets forth enough
facts to call upon the officer for the exercise of his judg-
ment upon the weight and importance of the evidence stated it
is sufficient. (Conklin v. Dutcher, 5 How. Pr. 386) To de-
feat his jurisdiction it must be made to appear that there is
a total want of evidence upon some material point. (Schoon-
maker v. Spencer, 54 N. Y. 366)
Allegations upon information and belief only, are
not sufficient, and do not give the court jurisdiction to
issue the warrant. (Steuben Co. Bank v. Alberger, 78 N. Y.
252) The sources of information and the grounds of belief
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must be stated, so that the judicial officer to whom the af-
fidavit is presented may judge whether the information and
belief have a proper basis to rest on; and if he is satisfied
that they have, then the affidavit is sufficient to invoke
jurisdiction and to be submitted to his determination. Abso-
lute certainty is not expected; the evidence is sufficient if
it is convincing and satisfactory; all that is required is
that the information furnished by the affidavit shall be such
that a person of reasonable prudence would be willing to ac-
cept and act upon it. (Buell v. Van Camp, 119 N. Y. 160;
Bennett v. Edwards, 27 Hun. 352) In Buell v. Van Camp, supra,
the plaintiff averred that the source of his information and
the grounds of his belief were the affidavits of two persons
named, copies ofwhich were annexed,the original not being
obtainable, and this was held to be sufficient. But where
the sources of information were stated to be contained in
affidavits on file in court, but which were not quoted or any
portion of them stated, it was held insufficient. (Selser
Bros. Co. v. Potter Produce Co., 77 Hun. 313)
Where a person baving positive knowledge of the
facts refuses to make an affidavit, the applicant is not ob-
liged to procure an order under section 885 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, requiring him to appear before before a ref-
eree and submit to an examination; but the fact of such re-
fusal may be stated, together with the knowledge the person
is known to possess, and any affidavit made by such reluctant
witness,w showing the facts, if on file, may be quoted and
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referred to. (Bennett v. Edwards, 27 Hun; 352) But mere in-
convenience is not a sufficient reason for not producing the
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the
facts relied upon to make a case for the granting of the war-
rant. (Brewster v. Van Camp, 28 St. Rep. 591) If a verified
complaint is relied on as affidavit, and the allegations, or
any portion of them, are made upon information and belief, a
positive affidavit verifying its statements makes it suffi-
cient evidence of the existence of a cause of action. (Edick
v. Green, 38 Hun. 202)
We have seen that when the affidavit is made upon
information and belief that it is necessary that the sources
of affiant's information and the grounds of his belief should
be stated, and it is, therefore, important to determine when
an affidavit sworn to positively by a person who is not shown
to be in ,a position to have personal knowledge of the subject,
is presumed to have been made on personal knowledge and
thereforel sufficient, and when he must state the sources of
his information and the grounds of his belief.
Statements in an affidavit will be presued to have
been made on personal knowledge unless stated to be made on
information and belief, except where it appears affirmatively
and by fair inference, that they could not have been, and were
not, made on such knowledge, (Crowns v. Vail, 51 Hun. 204) ,
or that affiant did not necessarily have personal knowledge
of the facts. (McVicker v. Campanini, 24 State Rep. 643)
Stated in other words, the rule to be deduced from these cases
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seems to be, that where the affiant is not a party to the
transaction, that there is no presumption that he has person-
al knowledge of the facts sworn to, and he must therefore
show that he has personal knowledge of the facts, or else
show such circumstances that will raise a presumption that he
has.a personal knowledge of the facts. (See upon this sub-
ject generally Buhl v. Ball, 41 Hun. 61, at 64)
Thus far the rule seems to be well settled, but
there is a considerable conflict of authority as to what cir-
cumstances are sufficient to raise a presumption that the
facts are within the personal knowledge of the affiant. This
is so concerning affidavits made by the officers of a corpor-
ation. Where the affidavit is made by the agent or attorney
of the plaintiff, there is no doubt but that it must appear
that affiant had personal knowledge of the facts sworn to, or
that he had such relations to the business of his principal
as to justify the inference that he knows what he states.
(Buhl v. Ball, 41 Hun. 61) In Crowns v. Vail, (51 Hun. 204),
it-was head- that where the affidavit in respect to a trans-
action of his client is made by one who is simply the attor-
ney of record, that the plain inference is that such attorney
has not personal knowledge of the facts as to which he af firm-
ed. The allegations must be presumed not to be within the
knowledge of the attorney, and such being the case, they must
have been made upon information, and in the case of McVicker v.
Campanini, (24 State Rep. 643), where the affiant alleged
that he was the son of the plaintiff and had a knowledge of
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the facts, but did not show how he had acquired a knowledge
in respect to those facts, it was held not sufficient to in-
fer a personal knowledge of the facts sworn to. As before
pointed out, the greatest conflict is in the case of affi-
davits of the officers of a corporation. Attention is called
to two recent cases on this point decided by the General Term
of the First Department. In Hodgman v. Barker, (60 Hun. 156),
the affiant was an officer, cashier, of the moving creditor,
which was a banking corporation. In an opinion written by
Mr. Justice Van Brunt, the presiding Justice, it was decided
that the allegation of the cashier of the bank, that certain
notes upon which money had been procured by the defendant
were forged, was not sufficient, as it was not a plain in-
ference that the affiant had any personal knowledge of the
facts, and it was not shown affirmatively that he had. At
the next term of the same court, held a month later, Mr.
Justice Van Brunt wrote another opinion, in which he applied
the same rule to the affidavit of the President of the cor-
poration, which was the moving creditor. That the fact that
deponent was President of the moving creditor would not just-
ify the inferencei of knowledge. His associates did not con-
cur in this, but wrote opinions in which they held, that the
President's position as chief executive officer of the com-
pany, justified the inference that when he swears positively
with regard to a corporate transaction he speaks of his own
personal knowledge. But this is true only when it appears
that deponent was President at the time that the transaction
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out of which the claim arose, took place,. (Manufacturers'
National Bank v. Hall, 60 Hun. 466) And in the case of the
cashier of a bank, it has been held that because of his posi-
tion he is presumed to be acquainted with the financial af-
fairs of the corporation of which he is an officer. (Natio-
nal Park Bank v. Whitmore, 40 Hun. 499) There are other con-
flicting cases upon this point, but it is submitted that the
case of Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, v. Hall, supra, lays down
the correct rule.
But where the affiant does not necessarily have
knowledge of ar cannot be presumed to know the several facts
stated in his affidavit, it will be sufficient if he states
facts which tend to show that he has personal knowledge of
the facts required to be stated. (McVicker v. Oampanini, 24
State Rep. 643) Thus where it appears that the affiant was
the agent of the plaintiff, and that he had personally sold
and delivered to the defendant the goods, to recover the price
of which the action was brought, and that the plaintiffs were
themselves in no manner personally consected with the trans-
action, it was held a statement of such facts as would show a
personal knowledge of the contents of the affidavit. (Grib-
bon v. Back, 35 Hun. 541)
But it should be remembered that while it has been
shown that where the affiant will not be presumed to have a
personal knowledge of the facts to which he swears, and the
affidavit is therefore treated as though made upon informa-
tion and belief, that by showing the sources of the informa-
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tion and the grounds of the belief, the affidavit will never-
theless be sufficient.
"THAT OTTE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION SPECIFIED IN THE
LAST SECTION EXISTS AGAINST THE DEFERDANT. IF THE ACTION IS
TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT." It is only when
the action is to recover damages for breach of contract, ex-
press or implied, that the plaintiff must show the facts re-
quired by sub-division I of section 636, except that the re-
quirement "that one of the causes of action specified in the
last section exists against the defendant" must be complied
with in every case. (Campion etc. Co. v. Searing, 47 Hun.
237)
"THE AFFIDAVIT MUST SHOW THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER." It must appear either expressly or by
fair inference that the debt which the action was brought to
recover is due. (Reilly v. Sisson, 31 Hun. 573; Smadbeck v.
Sisson,. id. 582)
"A SUM STATED THEREIN." It must appear that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover a particular sum, which is
specified. A general averment of damages is not sufficient.
(Golden etc. Co. v. Jackson, 13 Abb. N. C. 476) Nor is it
sufficient if the affidavit states that the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover the sum of $10,000.00 or a larger sum, over
and above all counter-claims. (Thorington v. Merrick, 101
N. Y. 5)
"OVER AID ABOVE ALL C0UNTER-CLAIMS." It is not nec-
essarythat the affidavit should state the precise words used
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in the Code, if equivalent words be used. It is sufficient
if. the affidavit furnishes evidence from which the Judge who
grants the warrant may be lawfully satisfied of the truth of
the facts required to be shown, but there must be some evi-
dence. The statament "over and above all discounts and set-
offs" is equivalent to "over and above all counterclaims."
(Lamkin v. Douglass, 27 Hun. 517) But an averment that "the
defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in a sum stated", and
that the latter "is justly entitled to recover said sum", is
not a'sufficient compliance with the Code, as it does not
follow that the defendant has not, to the knowledge of the
plaintiff, a counterclaim. (Ruppert v. Haug, 87 N. Y. 141)
"KNOV TO HIM." This phrase refers to the plaintiff,
and when the affidavit is not made by the plaintiff, the
question arises, how can the affiant swear to such knowledge
by the plaintiff. There is a large number of cases on this
point,. and they will not be reviewed here, as it is submitted
that the conclusions deduced from them by Bishop, in his
"Code Practice in Personal Actions", are correct. These con-
clusions are as follows:-
"1st If the affidavit is made by an agent, and he swears
to knowledge of the plaintiff, since this must necessarily be
upon information and belief, he must state the sources of
such information and belief or the affidavit will be insuffi-
cient."
"2d If the affidavit is made by an agent, it will not
belenough for him to swear to a sum due over and above all
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counterclaims known to him; he is not the plaintiff. The
defect is held to be jurisdictional."
"3d When an agent makes the affidavit, and it appears
that the transaction was within his own knowledge, his affi-
davit that the sum is due over and above all counterclaims
known to the plaintiff will be accepted."
"4th When the plaintiff is a corporation and the affi-
davit is made by an officer of the corporation, enough must
appear respecting his position and duties to create an infer-
ence that he knew the condition of the transactions between
the plaintiff and the defendant. As in the case of a cashier
of a bank." (Bishop's Code Practice in.Personal Actions,
p .244)
"THAT THE DEFENDANT IS EITHER A FOREIGN CORPORATION."
Togive the court jurisdiction to grant an attachment against
a foreign corporation, the affidavit in addition to setting
forth a cause of-action for which an attachment may be grant-
ed must show that the action could be maintained against the
foreign corporation. (Oliver v. Walter Heywood Chair Co., 32
State Rep. 542) This is regulated by section 1780 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which provides that, if the plaintiff be
a resident of the State, or a domestic corporation, an action
may be maintained for any cause of action. But if the plain-
tiff be a non-resident or another foreign corporation, an
action can be maintained only where the action is brought to
recover damages for breach of a contract made within the
State, or relating to property situated within the State at
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the time of the making thereof; or where the cause of action
arose within the State; except where the object of the action
is to effect the title to real property situated without the
State. The causes of action mentioned in sub-division second
of this section are not enumerated here, as they are not
actions in which a warrant may be granted.
It is enough to aver affirmatively that the defend-
ant is a foreign corporation, stating the statecountry or
government by or under whose laws created, (Section 1775 of
the Code of Civil Procedure ), but an allegation that the
above named defendant "is or holds itself out to be a foreign
corporation" is an allegation in the alternative and. not
sufficient. (Shanks v. Magnolia Metal Co., 89 N. Y.486)
Section 5798 of U. S. R. S., the National Banking
Act- authorizing suits against banking associations organized
under it, to be brought in the court of the county or city of
the State in which the association is located, is permissive,
not mandatory, and does not have the effect of depriving the
other courts of Jurisdiction. And section 5242 of said act,
prohibiting the issuing of an attachment against such an
association or its property before final judgment, applies
only to an association which has become insolvent or to one
about to become so, as specified in that section. A Judge,
therefore, has jurisdiction to issue a warrant of attachment
in an action against a national bank. (Robinson v. Nat. Bank,
81 N. Y. 385) But the attachment must be vacated if the bank
afterwardsbecomes insolvent& (National etc. Bank v. Mechan-
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ies Nat. Bank, 89 N. Y. 467)
"OR NOT A RESIDENT OF THE STATE." It is important
under this sub-division to observe the distinction between
residence and domicil, for an attachment on the ground of non-
residence may be granted, even although the defendant still
has his domicil in this state. (Mayor v. Genet, 4 Hun. 487;
affirmed, 63 N. Y. 646) Residence means a fixed or permanent
abode or dwelling place for the time being, as contra-disting-
uished from a temporary locality of existence. (Matter of
Wrigley, 8 Wend. 134; Bell v. Pierce, 51 N. Y. 12) Domicil
means something more than residence. It means an intention
to remain in a particular place as one's home. A person may
have his domicil in one state, and at the same time reside in
another, (Mayor v. Genet, supra); and so while a person can
have but one domicil, it is certain that he may have two res-
idences, and such is the case of every person who has a town-
house and a country-seat, in each of which he dwells at dif-
ferent seasons of the year, with the intention of making each
his permanent abode for a limited period. (Frost v. Brisbin,
19 Wend. 11) Actual cessation to dwell within the state for
an uncertain period, without definite intention as to any
fixed time of returning, even though a general intention to
return at some future time exists, constitutes non-residence.
(Weitkamp v. Loehr, 53 Super. Ct. 79) One who though domi-
ciled in this State, is living in another, with no abode here
nor any place, which he could caLl his home or to which he
could return on coming into the state, is a non-resident.
0
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(Wood v. Hamilton, 14 Daly 41) And where a defendant after
conviction and before sentence excaped, and after most stren-
uous efforts to discover his whereabouts were futilD , it was
held as the natural impulse promoting his escape would be at
once to place himself out of the limits of the state of con-
viction, that he would be presumed to have accomplished this
as soon as the circumstances would allow it to be done. And
that the same reason which prompted his escape, would keep
him from returning and would induce him to continue his res-
idence abroad indefinitely, and, he is therefore a non-resl-
dent. (Mayor v. Genet, supra)
S . The fact that a resident of another state has a
place of business here does not constitute him a resident of
the State within the attachment law. (Wallace v. Castle, 68
N. Y. 370) And one who maintains his family in,- another
state, and frequently resorts to his home with them there,
may be deemed a non-resident of the State within the attach-
ment laws, notwithstanding he has furnished appartments in-
connection with his place of business in this State and there
lodges and takes his meals. (Murphy v. Baldwin, 11 Abb. Pr.
N. S. 407)
The averment of the fact of non-residence in the
affidavit for attachment is sufficient. It is not necessary
to state. facts tending to support this. (Mvayor v. Genet,
sup ra)
* "IF1 HE IS A NATURAL PERSON AI) A RESIDENT OF THE
STATE, THAT HE HAS DEPARTED THEREFROM WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD
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HISV CREDITORS, OR TO AVOID THE SERVICE OF A SUMMONS, OR KEEPS
HIMSELF CONCEALED THEREIN WITH LIKE INTENT." It must appear
that the defendant has departed with intent to defraud his
creditors, or to avoid the service of a summons; and it is
not necessary that the departure be secret. (Hertz v. Stuart,
3 Week. Dig. 332; Morgan v. Avery, 7 Barb. 656)
Where the application for anatachment is on the
ground that defendant has. kept himself concealed withv intent
to avoid the service of a summons, it is not sufficient to
show that defendant could not be found at his place of busi-
ness, although an attempt was made to find him there on sev-
eral occasions. The purpose to accomplish a concealment with
intent to avoid 6the service of a summons must be clearly and
positively shown.. Conjecture, surmise and suspicion are not
sufficient. The proofs shouldkbe of such a chaTacter as to
fairly justify no other construction, and dishonest purposes
on the part of the defendant. (Head v. Wollner, 53 Hun. 615)
The affidavits in Head v..Wollner, supra, which were held in-
sufficient, were to the effect that the deponent on several
occasions went to- the place of business of defendant and could
not find him; that he telephoned to such place of business;
that the voice which answered, the deponent thought to be
that of the defendant, but when he stated who had called,
another voice replied. A deponent in another affidavit in
the same action, alleged upon information and belief, that
the.defendant kept himself concealed to avoid the service of
19
a summons upon him.
But slight circumstances are sufficient to estab-
lish that the intent with which the departure was made, was
to defraud creditors or avoid the service of a sunons. No
court is required to worry itself to find excuses for a fugi-
tive from debt. The question of insolvency, although of great
importance, is not controlling. If a perfectly solvent man
departs from the State with intent to defraud his creditors
or avoid the service of process, his property may be attach-
ed. (Schoonmaker v. Spencer, 54 N. Y. 366)
Where it appeared that the defendant is absent from
his usual residence and place qof business during business
hours, when he is about to fail, and soon after a demand has-
been made upon him for a debt, and he refused to reveal his
place of resort, it was held to sufficiently appear that de-
fendant kept himself concealed to avoid the service of a sum-
mons. (Easton v. Malavazi, 7 Daly 147; Genin v. Tompkins, 12
Barb. 265) In the last case cited the concealment was for
only nine hours, and it was held that the length of timerdur-
ing which the defendant kept himself concealed, was not mat-e
erial, if the intent appear.
In Buell v. Van Camp, (28 St. Rep. 907), it appear-
ed that the defendant had gone away without the knowledge of
his neighbors; that his wife had received a letter from him
which caused her much grief, and that she said he had gone to
Canada; it also appeared that defendant had been called upon
in anotherproceeding to account as executor. These circum-
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stances were held to make out a case tending to show that the
defendant had left the State with intent to defraud his cre-
ditors or to avoid the service of a summons.
It is not tufficient if defendant keeps himself
concealed to avoid the service of criminal process. (Lynde v.
Montgomery, 15 Wend. 461)
It need not appear whether the defendant has left
the State, or is concealed within it, if it is made to appear
that he is not in his usual resort and cannot be discovered,
and circumstances are shown from which it can be inferred
that the intent is either to avoid the service of a summons
upon him, or to defraud his creditors. The requirements of
the statute are satisfied. The case may be stated in the al-
ternative. It-may be stated that the-defendant has departed
from the State, or keeps himself concealed therein, and that
the intent of the debtor was to defraud his creditors, or to
avoid the service of a summons. (Van Alstyne v. Erwine, 11
N. Y. e331)
The facts must show that the defendants against
whom the process is sought, have done the acts; the fact that
one partner has absconded will not entitle the plaintiff to a
warrant of attachment against the property of the firm, un-
less it appears that all have absconded, with the required
intent. (Bogart v. Dart, 25 Hun. 395) Proof that one of the
partners ;has absconded will entitle the plaintiff to an at-
tachment against the property of that one. (Buckingham v.
Sevezey,';25,Hun. 85)
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"IF THE DEFENDANT IS A NATURAL PERSON OR A DOMESTIC
CORPORATION, THAT HE OR IT HAS REMOVED, OR IS ABOUT TO REMOVE
PROPERTY FROM THE STATE, WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD HIS OR ITS
CREDITORS; OR HAS ASSIGNED, DISPOSED OR SECRETED, OR IS ABOUT
TO ASSIGN, DISPOSE OR SECRETE PROPERTY WITH THE LIKE INTENT."
A plaintiff applying for an attachment under this sub-divi-
sion is called upon to act with promptness; and where the
fraudulent disposition occurred several years before an action
brought, must show a satisfactory excuse for his delay or a
very clear case of fraud, before an attachment will be grant-
ed. (Allen v. Herschorn,'9 Abb. Pr. N. S. 80)
The property which is removed or secreted must be
that of the defendant; the fact that defendant has disposed
of the property of the plaintiff or of a third person with
intent to defraud that person, is not sufficient, (German
Bank v. Dash, 60 How. Pr. 124) and it is not enough to show
an assignment, disposal or secretion of plaintiff's own pro-
perty by defendant, and further allege that by that act de-
fendant converted the prpperty so that it became his own,
since the title remained in the plaintiff until he waived the
tort by bringing suit on contract. (Empire Warehouse Co. v.
Mallett, 84 Hun. 561)
Nor is it necessary that the defendant has disposed
or is about to dispose, of all his property; if he disposes
of a part of his property (Hyman V. Kapp, 22 Week. Dig. 310),
or of any property in his possession and to which he claims
title, although his title is imperfect or bad, (Treadwell v.
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Lawlor, 15 How. Pr. 8), it is sufficient. And it is immater-
ial where the fraudulent disposition takes place so long as
the court in this State has jurisdiction of the parties.
(Kibbe v. Wetmore, 31 Hun. 424)
In this sub-division, as under the last, it is nec-
essary that the intent should appear, and facts showing in-
tent must be stated. (Hertz v. Stuart, 3 Week. Dig. 332;
Fleitmann v. Seckle, 13 State Rep. 399) The intent shown
must be an actual fraudulent .motive, and acts. from which the
law infers an intent to defraud, irrespective of actual
motive, or which are said to be constructively-, fraudulent,
are not sufficient. Thus a general assignment which confers,,
upon the assignee the power to sell the.assigned property on
credit, is constructively fraudulent, as the law infers an
intent to work a fraud on creditors. even although the assign-
or entertained no fraudulent motiveo and will be set akide,,
but the insertion of the power to sell on creditt would -be- no
ground for the granting of a warrant of attachment, as there
was no actual fraudulent intent, but merely a constructive
fraud, or fraud in law. The fraudulent intent under this
section involves an actual motive to defraud, and not merely
a constructive intent inferred by the law from an act which
in itself may be consistent with an honest purpose. (Milliken
v. Dart, 26 Hun. 24; Citizens' Bank v. Williams, 128 N. Y.
77) It should be remembered that a person is presumed to
have intended the natural consequences of his own act, and if
his acts have a necessary tendency to defraud, the intent
23
will be presumed.
Fraud assumes so great a variety of forms, that no
classification of the cases can be given here. Insolvency,
secrecy, unusual haste, transfers to near relatives on the
eve of failure, deceptions and falsehoods, are circumstances
which often accompany or characterize a fraudulent intent.
It is to be noticed, that here, as in other cases,
a statement in the disjunctive is proper, where the facts
stated show that the case falls under one or the other of the
two classes, and so an affidavit which averred that money had
"been disposed of by said defendant with intent to defraud
these plaintiffs or is concealed by him with like intent" was
held sufficient. (Arming v. Monteverde, 8 St. Rep..812)
"WHERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROCURING CREDIT, OR THE EXTEN*.
S ION OF CREDIT, THE DEFENDANT HAS MADE A FALSE STATEMENT IN
WRITING, UNDER HIS OWN HAND OR SIGNATURE, OR UNDER THE HAND
OR SIGNATURE OF A DULY AUTHORIZED AGENT, MADE WITH HIS KNOW-
LEDGE, AND ACQUIESCENCE, AS TO HIS FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
OR STANDING." This sub-division is a recent amendment, it
taking effect September 1st, 1894.
"WHERE THE DEFENDANT BEING AN ADULT AND A RESIDENT
OF THE STATE, HAS BEEN CONTINUOUSLY WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES
FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS NEXT BEFORE THE GR ANTING OF THE OR-
DER OF PUBLICATION OF THE SUMMO0NS AGAINST HIM, AND HAS NOT
MADE A DESIGNATION OF A PERSON UPON WHOM TO SERVE A SUMMONS
IN HIS BEHALF, AS PRESCRIBED IN SECTION FOUR HUNDRED AND THIR-
TY OF THIS ACT; OR A DESIGNATION SO MADE NO LONGER REMAINS IN
24
FORCE; OR SERVICE UPON THE PERSON SO DESIGNATED CANNOT BE
MADE WITHIN THE STATE, AFTER DILIGENT EFFORT." This sub-
division is new, and took effect September 1st, 1895.
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